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Case No. 900428-CA 
BEVAN C. BOWLES, Civil No. 87440778 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 16 
/ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee concurs with appellant's Statement of Facts with the 
exception of paragraph 21 and paragraph 24. Appellee sets forth a 
more correct statement of the facts with respect to these two noted 
paragraphs as well as additional facts relevant to the case. 
1. Janet Bowles testified that she was employed full-time in 
the Alpine School District working 30 hours per week at an hourly 
rate of $7.47 per hour and that she had earned $8,885.00 from that 
employment in 1989. (T. 60, 61 and 62). 
2. With respect to paragraph 24 of appellant's statement of 
facts, appellant's statement that "the Court was aware that a lot 
of construction was going on in St. George." is an incorrect 
statement. Rather, the Court stated "But by his own testimony, it 
appears to the Court that that is a moving construction area." The 
Court was referring to the St. George area and to the appellant's 
testimony regarding construction opportunities in that area. 
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3. Mr. Bowles only made job search efforts in the Provo-Orem 
area. (T. 18) . 
4. Mr. Bowles only looked for construction and backhoe type 
work until the middle of December, 1989, a period of approximately 
6 weeks. (T. 18). 
5. Mr. Bowles made no effort to obtain employment other than 
part-time, minimum wage employment from mid-December, 1989, through 
the date of trial, June 20, 1990, a period of 7 months,, (T. 48) . 
6. Mr. Bowles sought employment with only one company that 
did backhoe work. (T. 39-40). 
7. Mr. Bowles was the owner of a backhoe but had not used it 
for more than a year, nor had he attempted to lease it for the 
purpose of earning income. (T. 45, 58). 
8. Mr. Bowles has been allowing a friend to use the backhoe 
for free. (T. 47, 58). 
9. Mr. Bowles stated that the backhoe could be leased for 
$35.00 per hour. (T. 48). 
10. Mr. Bowles testified that there were a lot of 
construction companies in St. George but that he really hadn't 
checked into what work might be available for him. (T. 58). 
11. Mr. Bowles wouldn't make the backhoe available for Mrs. 
Bowles to lease out. (T. 46). 
12. Mrs. Bowles testified that she had had at least one offer 
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to lease the backhoe from her for $20.00 per hour for 20 to 30 
hours per week. (T. 72-73). 
13. Mr. Bowles owns a one-half interest in a home in Nephi 
but doesn't want the money from the sale of said home to go for the 
support of his minor children. (T. 48-49). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The petitioner for modification of Decree of Divorce has 
the burden of submitting credible evidence to the trial court that 
there has been a material change in circumstances sufficient to 
warrant the modification requested. The court is required to view 
the evidence of each changed circumstance in light of all the facts 
and circumstances of the case in making its determination of 
whether the evidence submitted meets the threshold requirement. 
Loss of job and proof of reduced income do not automatically 
require the trial court to find that a material change in 
circumstance has occurred when evidence of other important factors 
such as job seeking efforts and asset utilization efforts establish 
that the petitioner's reduced income status is the result of an 
exercise of personal preference to be a full-time student rather 
than a full-time earner. 
2. If the party petitioning the court for a modification of 
child support fails to convince the court that a material change in 
circumstance has occurred to warrant such a change, the court is 
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not required to make findings of fact concerning the petitioner's 
ability to pay child support. An order requiring the petitioner to 
pay child support is already in effect and based upon the 
petitioner's ability to pay. The trial court need not reexamine 
these issues because the petitioner has failed to produce the 
requisite evidence that would allow the court to make the requested 
modification. 
3. A finding that there has been no material change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification in a child 
support award is not an imputation of income to the petitioner. 
Neither the court's findings nor anything in the trial transcript 
indicates or implies that the court has imputed income to the 
appellant, but rather, refuses to impute a lower income to the 
appellant because of his loss of job. Therefore, the court neither 
erred nor abused its discretion. 
4. The trial court considered all of the appellants job 
search efforts as part of the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether appellant's reduced income status warranted a finding that 
a substantial change in circumstance had occurred. The trial court 
also considered the appellant's testimony concerning the number of 
construction companies operating in the St. George area and 
appellant's testimony that he did not inquire after employment with 
those companies in the aforesaid determination. The trial court 
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did not take judicial notice of the availability of employment in 
the St, George area but only accepted appellant's testimony 
concerning this factor. Considering appellant's job search efforts 
and potential employment opportunities were well within the court's 
proper evaluation of the case and not error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Proof of reduced income does not automatically require 
the trial court to find that a material change in 
circumstances has occurred sufficient to warrant 
modification of a decree of divorce. 
A party seeking to have a decree of divorce modified must 
assert and prove that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree of divorce. 
fJense v. Jense, 124 Ut. Adv. Rep. 56 (December 21, 1989) Ut. Ct. 
App.). In the present case, the appellant claims that because he 
lost his job and remains unemployed or underemployed, that the 
trial court was required to find that a substantial change of 
circumstance existed sufficient to warrant lowering his child 
support obligation. But the trial court isn't required to view 
appellant's evidence in a vacuum. "Indeed, Section 78-45-7(2) 
lists a parentfs income and ability to earn as two separate, 
presumably distinct, factors to be considered by the court as it 
sets the amount of child support." Proctor v. Proctor. 773 P.2d 
1389 (Utah App. 1989) . Therefore, the trial court in this case was 
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required to consider not only appellant's present lack of income 
but also his earning capacity as well. 
The evidence established that Mr. Bowles income was quite low 
because he lost his job, now worked only part-time at a minimum 
wage occupation, and attended college on a full-time basis. The 
evidence also established that Mr. Bowles had not made any effort 
during the past 7 months to obtain full-time employment in the 
construction trades despite his knowledge that there many 
construction companies in the St. George area using backhoe 
equipment and the fact that Mr. Bowles was licensed as an 
excavator. Furthermore, the evidence before the trial court 
established that Mr. Bowles owned a backhoe that could be used for 
earning income of at least $20.00 per hour for 20 to 30 hours per 
week, either by self operation or by leasing, but that Mr. Bowles 
had made no effort to utilize the backhoe. 
The evidence before the court showed that although Mr. Bowles 
may have had diminished income, he had ample opportunity to earn 
but failed to make a good faith effort to utilize those 
opportunities. This Court has previously stated "that an able 
bodied person who stops working, as an exercise of personal 
preference . . ., nonetheless retains the ability to earn and the 
duty to support his or her children." Proctor v. Proctor, Ibid at 
1391. The appellant may not have quit his job, but his decision to 
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attend college rather than seek to earn income at his full 
potential is such an exercise of personal preference. 
The trial court weighed all of the evidence before it and 
determined that Mr. Bowles had failed to meet the threshold 
requirement that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred 
to his earning capacity, not merely to his income. 
POINT II 
The trial court is not required to make findings of fact 
concerning appellant's income if the court finds that no 
substantial change in circumstance has occurred. 
Mr. Bowles argues that the trial court erred in not making 
findings of fact concerning his ability to pay child support. But 
findings of fact regarding ability to pay are not necessary when 
the court finds that no substantial change of circumstance has 
occurred. (Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah 
1983)). If the party seeking modification fails to convince the 
trial court of this threshold requirement, then the trial court 
does not need to examine the other factors set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-7(2). Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 
1990) . 
Although the trial court found that appellant's lay off was a 
substantial change in his employment circumstance, it did not find 
a substantial change had occurred in his earning ability. Rather, 
it found Mr. Bowles to have made inadequate effort at gaining 
7 
employment or exercising his earning capacity either by searching 
for work or utilizing the backhoe. "And for that reason, the court 
does not believe that I can legitimately find a material change in 
circumstances that would justify the court in reducing the 
obligation for child support at this time." (T. 88 at lines 18 
through 21). Therefore, it was the trial court's opinion that the 
threshold requirement was not established by appellant and it 
became necessary only to find that the change of circumstance did 
not warrant modification. (Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
592, 595 (Utah 1983)). 
POINT III 
The trial court did not impute income to appellant. 
Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in its 
application of child support guidelines and the imputed income 
statute is based upon two incorrect premises. First, the trial 
court did not impute income to appellant. By findingr that the 
changed circumstances were insufficient to warrant a modification 
in the child support award, the trial court had no need to impute 
income to Mr. Bowles. It did not impute any amount of income to 
Mr. Bowles nor apply the child support guidelines in this matter. 
Second, appellant is incorrect in his assertion that by 
finding that no substantial change of circumstance existed to 
justify modifying the child support award the court implies an 
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imputation of income at Mr. Bowles former level. The trial court 
was well aware that Mr. Bowles income was greatly reduced. It also 
had sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Bowles had 
more earning capability than his present low income proved. 
The trial court advised Mr. Bowles that lack of effort to earn 
would not be rewarded with a reduction in child support but that 
the evidence presented to the court was insufficient to determine 
what lower amount of income could be imputed to him. If Mr. Bowles 
had made effort to gain full-time employment in construction in the 
area he had been living for six months prior to trial, the trial 
court would have had evidence of what pay rate, number of hours, 
etc. were available to him. If Mr. Bowles had made efforts to hire 
out the backhoe, an hourly rate and number of hours per month of 
income from this source would have been available for the court to 
use to either determine or impute income to Mr. Bowles. By 
voluntarily remaining underemployed and not utilizing the backhoe 
to earn income, the appellant disallowed the court from imputing 
any lower income to him. 
The trial court only ruled that until appellant submitted 
adequate evidence of a good faith effort to earn income at his 
potential, that the court was not justified in finding the 




The trial court neither erred in considering appellant's 
job search efforts nor took judicial notice of factors 
outside of the record. 
Appellant's brief suggests that he made job inquiries for a 
period of 26 weeks and made 52 such inquiries. The trial 
transcript does not support those suggestions. Mr. Bowles made 
only two job applications per week during the month prior to 
beginning school. (T. 16) . He made those job applications in 
November and December of 1989 and terminated his job searching by 
the middle of December, 1989. (T. 17, 18). He testified of six 
employers he applied to and further testified that there were two 
or three other employers whose names he couldn't remember with whom 
he'd made application. (T. 18). After mid-December, he did no 
more than look on the job board in St. George and he made no 
application and had no interviews there because he was too busy 
with school. (T. 41). 
The trial court was fully aware of Mr. Bowles efforts to find 
employment. It remarked on his efforts to get employment (T. 86) , 
its lack of satisfaction at those efforts (T. 87) , and its finding 
that it didn't think he was making a legitimate effort to obtain 
employment (T. 88) . The trial court considered this limited effort 
to find full-time work, the seven month hiatus in meaningful job 
search activity and the factors of full-time schooling and part-
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time work to be unsupportive of appellant's position that no 
employment beyond part-time minimum wage jobs existed for him. 
Mr. Bowles also asserts that the trial court took judicial 
notice of possible employment available in St. George. The court 
did not take judicial notice of this fact but accepted it based on 
appellant's own testimony. During the course of trial the trial 
judge asked Mr. Bowles, "What work might be available in St. George 
for a backhoe?" (T. 58 at lines 14-15). Mr. Bowles answered, 
"There is a lot of construction companies down there with equipment 
like that. I haven't really checked into it." (T. 58, at lines 16 
through 18). 
From this exchange, the trial judge found that Mr. Bowles 
"checked the board a couple of times in St. George. By his own 
testimony, it appears to the court that that is a moving 
construction area." (T. 86 at lines 21 through 24). The trial 
court did not take judicial notice of the status of the 
construction industry in St. George but based its opinion on Mr. 
Bowles testimony. Therefore, there was neither error or abuse of 
discretion made by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant had the burden, as the petitioner for modification, 
to present the trial court with sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that a substantial change of circumstance had occurred with 
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respect to the child support issue so as to allow the trial court 
to consider such a change. Although appellant provided the trial 
court with evidence of his diminished income, the trial court 
concluded that his insufficient efforts to obtain full-time 
employment or earn income from his backhoe did not justify a 
finding that appellant had met the threshold requirement for 
obtaining modification of a decree of divorce. 
Each of the appellant's arguments derive from his belief that 
the trial court erred in not finding that his loss of employment 
alone met this threshold requirement. Each of his arguments fails 
because the trial court correctly considered all of the evidence 
before it in determining that appellant had not shown sufficient 
change of circumstances to warrant modification. 
Appellee, therefore, respectfully submits that the lower 
court's ruling should be upheld. 
DATED 
Howard Chuntz y 
Of Attorneys for Respondent 
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